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I construct a theoretical framework in which ﬁrms oﬀer wage-tenure contracts to direct
the search by risk-averse workers. All workers can search, on or oﬀ the job. I characterize an
equilibrium and prove its existence. The equilibrium generates a non-degenerate, continuous
distribution of employed workers over the values of contracts, despite that all matches are
identical and workers observe all oﬀers. A striking property is that the equilibrium is block
recursive; that is, individuals’ optimal decisions and optimal contracts are independent of the
distribution of workers. This property makes the equilibrium analysis tractable. Consistent
with stylized facts, the equilibrium predicts that (i) wages increase with tenure, (ii) job-to-job
transitions decrease with tenure and wages, and (iii) wage mobility is limited in the sense
that the lower the worker’s wage, the lower the future wage a worker will move to in the next
job transition. Moreover, block recursivity implies that changes in the unemployment beneﬁt
and the minimum wage have no eﬀe c to na ne m p l o y e dw o r k e r ’ sj o b - t o - j o bt r a n s i t i o n sa n d
contracts.
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Search on the job is prevalent and generates large job-to-job transitions. On average, 2.6 percent
of employed workers in the U.S. change employers each month, and nearly two-ﬁfths of new jobs
represent employer changes (Fallick and Fleischman, 2004). This large ﬂow of workers between
jobs exhibits three stylized patterns. First, the longer the tenure that a worker has on his
current job, the less likely he will quit for another job (Farber, 1999). Second, controlling for
individual heterogeneity, wage is a key determinant of mobility: a worker with a higher wage is
less likely to quit for another job (Topel and Ward, 1992). Third, wage mobility is limited in
the following sense: controlling for individual characteristics, most of the transitions take place
between adjacent quintiles of wages at the lower end of the wage distribution and probabilities
of staying in a quintile are higher at the higher quintiles (Buchinsky and Hunt, 1999).
To explain these facts, I construct a theoretical framework to integrate wage-tenure contracts
and on-the-job search. In the model, ﬁrms enter the labor market competitively and oﬀer wage-
tenure contracts. Workers are risk averse and identical, all of whom can search for jobs. Search is
directed in the sense that, when making search decisions, agents take into account that a higher
oﬀer yields a lower matching rate for an applicant and a higher matching rate for a ﬁrm. Firms
can commit to the contracts but workers cannot commit to staying with a ﬁrm. I characterize an
equilibrium, prove its existence, and explore its properties.
The framework provides consistent explanations for the above facts. First, wages increase
with tenure, and job-to-job transitions decrease with tenure and wages. Making wages increase
continuously with tenure is the optimal way for a ﬁrm to backload wages when workers are risk
averse. As wages rise with tenure, a worker is less likely to quit because the probability of ﬁnding
higher wages elsewhere falls. Second, directed search strengthens the negative dependence of job-
to-job transitions on wages. As an optimal tradeoﬀ between oﬀers and matching rates, workers
with low wages choose to search for relatively low oﬀers. Because low oﬀers are relatively easier to
obtain, low-wage workers make job transitions with higher probabilities than high-wage workers.
Third, and similarly, directed search generates limited wage mobility. By climbing up the wage
ladder gradually, workers maximize the expected gain from search in each job transition.
An equilibrium has a non-degenerate, continuous distribution of wages or values, despite the
assumptions that all matches are identical and all workers observe all oﬀers. On-the-job search
generates a wage ladder among identical workers by creating dispersion among workers’ histories
of search outcomes. Wage-tenure contracts ﬁll in the gap between any two rungs of the ladder by
increasing wages continuously with tenure.
In addition to explaining the stylized facts, this paper formalizes and explores a key property
of an equilibrium with directed search, called “block recursivity”. That is, individuals’ decisions
and equilibrium contracts are independent of the distribution of workers over wages, although
the distribution aﬀects aggregate statistics. In general, the non-degenerate distribution can serve
as a state variable in individuals’ decisions. By eliminating this role of the distribution, block re-
cursivity makes the equilibrium analysis tractable. Block recursivity arises from directed search,
because the optimal tradeoﬀ between oﬀers and matching rates implies that workers at diﬀerent
wages choose to apply for diﬀerent oﬀers. With such endogenous separation, the workers who
1apply for a particular oﬀer cares about only the matching rate at that oﬀer, but not the distrib-
ution of workers over other oﬀers. In turn, the matching rate at each oﬀer is determined by free
entry of ﬁrms independently of the distribution of workers. Besides tractability, block recursivity
has a novel policy implication — changes in the unemployment beneﬁta n dt h em i n i m u mw a g e
have no eﬀe c to na ne m p l o y e dw o r k e r ’ sj o b - t o - j o bt r a n s i t i o n s .
This paper is closely related to Burdett and Coles (2003, BC henceforth). Both papers
predict that on-the-job search induces ﬁrms to backload wages, thus making wages increase and
quit rates decrease with tenure. As a main diﬀerence, BC assume that search is undirected as
workers exogenously receive oﬀers.1 With undirected search, wage mobility is not limited as in the
data, because all workers have the same probability of obtaining any particular oﬀer regardless of
their current wages. Moreover, to sustain a non-degenerate distribution of wages among identical
matches, BC assume that every worker observes at most one oﬀer before applying. In contrast,
I assume that all workers observe all oﬀers, which makes wage dispersion more robust and on-
the-job search more potent for explaining worker turnover. In addition, a diﬀerent apparatus is
required to establish existence of an equilibrium with directed search.
I model directed search as in Moen (1997) and Acemoglu and Shimer (1999a,b). To the
literature of directed search, the main contributions here are to incorporate wage-tenure contracts
and on-the-job search, and to formally establish existence of an equilibrium.2 Moen and Rosen
(2004) examine on-the-job search with contracts, but their assumption that on-the-job search is
entirely driven by changes in productivity eliminates the main issues and theoretical challenges
that I face here. Delacroix and Shi (2006) examine directed search on the job with identical
workers, but they assume that ﬁrms oﬀer constant wages, rather than wage-tenure contracts.
In this paper, all matches are identical and the productivity of a match is public information.
Although heterogeneity, private information and learning about productivity are important for
wage dynamics and turnover in reality, as modeled by Jovanovic (1979), Harris and Holmstrom
(1982), and Moscarini (2005), abstracting from them enables me to focus on search. Most of the
proofs are omitted in this paper but are available as supplementary materials.
2. The Model Environment
Consider a labor market that lasts forever in continuous time. There is a unit measure of ho-
mogeneous, risk-averse workers whose utility function in each period is u(w), where w is income.
The utility function has the standard properties: 0 <u 0(w) < ∞ and −∞ <u 00(w) < 0 for all
w ∈ (0,∞), and u0(0) = ∞. Workers cannot borrow against their future income. An employed
worker produces a ﬂow of output, y>0, and an unemployed worker enjoys the unemployment
beneﬁt, b>0. A worker dies at a Poisson rate δ ∈ (0,∞), and is replaced with a newborn who
is unemployed. Death is the only exogenous separation. Firms are identical and risk-neutral.
Jobs enter the market competitively: a ﬁrm can post a vacancy at a ﬂow cost k>0, and can
1BC extend the wage-posting model of Burdett and Mortensen (1998). Undirected search is also the feature of
another class of search models, pioneered by Diamond (1982), Mortensen (1982), and Pissarides (1990).
2Peters (1984, 1991) and Montgomery (1991) are two of the earliest formulations of directed search. Other
examples of directed search models include Julien, et al. (2000), Burdett, et al. (2001), Shi (2001, 2002), Coles
and Eeckhout (2003), and Galenianos and Kircher (2005).
2treat diﬀerent jobs independently. Firms announce wage-tenure contracts to recruit. A contract
is denoted as W = {˜ w(t)}∞
t=0,w h i c hs p e c i ﬁes the wage at each tenure length, t, conditional on
that the worker stays with the ﬁrm. Firms are assumed to commit to the contracts, but workers
c a nq u i taj o ba ta n yt i m e .I np a r t i c u l a r ,aﬁrm cannot respond to the employee’s outside oﬀers.
Normalize the production cost to 0. Firms and workers discount future with the same rate of
time preference ρ ≥ 0. Denote r = ρ + δ as the eﬀective discount rate.3
Throughout this paper, t denotes tenure rather than the calendar time. Denote V (t)a st h e
value of a contract at t, i.e., the worker’s lifetime expected utility generated by the remaining
contract at t. The value of a contract at t = 0 is called an oﬀer and denoted as x = V (0).
Denote an unemployed worker’s “tenure” as t = ∅, the unemployment beneﬁta sb =˜ w(∅), and
the value of unemployment as Vu = V (∅). All oﬀers are bounded in [V , ¯ V ], where
¯ V = u(¯ w)/r, V = u(b)/r. (2.1)
¯ w is the highest wage given later by (3.8), ¯ V the lifetime utility of a worker who is employed at
¯ w permanently until death, and V the lifetime utility of a worker who stays in unemployment
forever. I use the phrases “all x”a n d“ a l lV ” to mean all values in
£
V , ¯ V
¤
.
All workers, employed or unemployed, can search. There is a continuum of submarkets indexed
by the oﬀer x. Each submarket x has a tightness, θ(x), which is the ratio of applicants to
vacancies in that submarket. The total number of matches in submarket x is given by a linearly
homogeneous matching function, M(N (x),N(x)/θ(x)), where N (x) is the number of applicants
in the submarket. In submarket x,av a c a n c yi sﬁlled at the Poisson rate q(x) ≡ M(θ(x),1),
and an applicant obtains an oﬀer at the rate p(x) ≡ M(1,1/θ(x)). I refer to q(.)a st h ehiring
rate function,a n dp(.)a st h eemployment rate function.I na ne q u i l i b r i u m ,q(x) is increasing and
p(x) decreasing in x. Thus, search is directed in the sense that agents face a tradeoﬀ between
oﬀers and matching rates when choosing which submarket to enter. Since the matching rates act
as hedonic prices in each submarket, search is competitive.4
Although the function M is exogenous, the functions q(.), p(.)a n dθ(.) are equilibrium
objects. Following Moen and Rosen (2004), I eliminate θ from the above expressions for p and
q to express p(x)=M(q(x)). Because the function M(q) inherits all essential properties of the
function, M, I will take M(.) as a primitive of the model and refer to it as the matching function.
Focus on stationary equilibria where the set of oﬀered contracts and the functions, q(x)a n d




=0 ; ( i i )p(x) is bounded, continuous and concave for all x;
(iii) p(x) is strictly decreasing and continuously diﬀerentiable for all x<¯ V .
¾
(2.2)
3The assumptions on the contracts and the separation process are the same as in BC (2003). The main diﬀerence
of my model from BC is that search is directed here. Also, I do not impose BC’s assumption u(0) = −∞.F o ra
model in which ﬁrms can counter outside oﬀers, see Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002).
4Moen (1997) and Acemoglu and Shimer (1999a,b) formulate this competitive process of directed search. An
alternative is to formulate the process as a strategic game, e.g., Peters (1991), Burdett et al. (2001), and Julien
et al. (2000). The strategic formulation endogenizes the matching function, M, but the function converges to a
linearly homogeneous function when the number of participants in the market goes to inﬁnity. Moreover, Acemoglu
and Shimer (1999b) relax the assumption that each applicant observes all oﬀers, and Galenianos and Kircher (2005)
allow each applicant to send two or more applications at once.
3Iw i l lﬁrst characterize individuals’ decisions under any arbitrary p function that satisﬁes (2.2)
and then verify, in Theorem 4.1, that an equilibrium satisfying (2.2) exists indeed.
3. Workers’ and Firms’ Optimal Decisions
3.1. A Worker’s Optimal Search Decision
Refer to a worker’s value, V ,a st h ew o r k e r ’ sstate or type. If the worker searches in submarket
x, he obtains the oﬀer x at rate p(x), which yields the gain, (x − V ). The expected gain from
search in submarket x is p(x)(x − V ). The optimal search decision, x,s o l v e s :
S(V (t)) ≡ max
x∈[V (t),¯ V ]
p(x)(x − V ). (3.1)
Denote the solution as x = F(V ). I prove the following lemma in Appendix A:
Lemma 3.1. Assume (2.2). Then, F(¯ V )=¯ V . For all V<¯ V , the following results hold: (i)
F(V ) is interior, strictly increasing in V ,a n ds a t i s ﬁes:
V = F(V )+
p(F(V ))
p0(F(V ))
;( 3 . 2 )
(ii) F(V ) is unique for each V , and continuous in V ; (iii) S(V ) is diﬀerentiable, with S0(V )=
−p(F(V )) < 0;( i v )F(V2) − F(V1) ≤ (V2 − V1)/2 for all V2 ≥ V1;( v )I fp00(.) exists, then F0(V )
and S00 (V ) exist, with 0 <F0(V ) ≤ 1/2.
The following properties are noteworthy. First, F(V ) is unique for each V . For a worker at the
state V ,o ﬀers higher than F(V ) have too low employment rates to be optimal, while oﬀers lower
than F(V ) have too low values. Only the oﬀer F(V ) provides the optimal tradeoﬀ between the
value and the employment rate. Second, F (V ) is strictly increasing in V . That is, the higher a
worker’s state, the higher the oﬀer for which the worker will apply. Thus, the applicants separate
themselves according to their states. This endogenous separation arises because an applicant’s
current job is a backup for him when he fails to obtain the applied job. The higher this backup
v a l u ei s ,t h em o r et h ew o r k e rc a na ﬀord to “gamble” on the application and, hence, the higher
the oﬀer for which he will apply. Third, the expected gain from search, S(V ), and the actual gain
in percentage, (F −V )/V , diminish as V increases. Moreover, S00(V ) > 0; i.e., the expected gain
from search diminishes at a lower rate as V increases.
Endogenous separation of the applicants is a common result in directed search models (see
Acemoglu and Shimer, 1999a, Shi, 2001, Moen and Rosen, 2004, and Delacroix and Shi, 2006).
However, it is not a result in undirected search models (e.g., BC, and Burdett and Mortensen,
1998). With undirected search, workers receive oﬀers randomly and exogenously, and so there
is no counterpart to the search decision in (3.1). In section 5, I will contrast my model with
undirected search models on worker turnover and wage mobility.
43.2. Value Functions of Workers and Firms
Denote ˙ f = df /dt for any variable f.C o n s i d e rﬁr s ta ne m p l o y e dw o r k e rw h o s et e n u r ei st ≥ 0.
From the analysis above, the worker searches for the oﬀer x(t)=F(V (t)). At rate p(F (V (t))),
he gets the oﬀer and quits the current job. If the worker does not get the oﬀer, he stays in the
current contract whose value increases by ˙ V . Taking into account time discounting and the event
of death, the value for the worker obeys:
ρV (t)=u(˜ w(t)) + ˙ V (t)+p(F(V (t)))[F(V (t)) − V (t)] − δV(t).
Using S(V )d e ﬁned by (3.1), and the eﬀective discount rate r = ρ + δ, I can rewrite:
˙ V (t)=rV(t) − u(˜ w(t)) − S(V (t)). (3.3)
Because I focus on stationary equilibria, the change, ˙ V , is entirely caused by changes in wages
with tenure. If wages are constant, then ˜ w(t)=˜ w and ˙ V (t)=0f o ra l lt.5 In particular, because
the unemployment beneﬁt is constant, ˙ Vu =0 ,a n dVu obeys:
0=rVu − u(b) − S(Vu). (3.4)
Since S (Vu) > 0, it is clear that Vu >V,w h e r eV is deﬁned in (2.1).
Now consider the value of a ﬁrm whose worker has a contract with a remaining value, V (t).
Let ˜ J(t)d e n o t et h i sﬁrm’s value. Similar to (3.3), I can derive
d ˜ J (t)/dt =[ r + p(F(V (t)))] ˜ J(t) − y +˜ w(t). (3.5)






[r + p(F(V (τ)))]dτ
¸
.( 3 . 6 )




[y − ˜ w(t)]γ(t,ta)dt. (3.7)
3.3. Optimal Recruiting Decisions and Contracts
A ﬁrm’s recruiting decision contains two parts. The ﬁrst is to choose an oﬀer x to maximize the
expected value of recruiting, q(x) ˜ J(0), taking the function q(.) as given. The second part is to
choose a contract to deliver the value x and to maximize ˜ J(0).





,w h e r ev1 ≡ F (Vu). A high oﬀer increases the chance of ﬁlling the vacancy but yields
lower proﬁte xp o s t .Al o wo ﬀer yields higher ex post proﬁt, but reduces the chance of ﬁlling the
5Although a worker can quit the job to b e c o m eu n e m p l o y e d ,i ti sn o to p t i m a lt od os oi na ne q u i l i b r i u m ,b e c a u s e
optimal contracts provide higher values in employment than in unemployment. Also, because an employed worker
never returns to unemployment, the worker has no incentive to save provided that wages increase with tenure.
5vacancy. A ﬁrm is indiﬀerent among the oﬀers in V, because they all yield the same expected
value of recruiting. That is, q(x) ˜ J (0) = k for all x ∈ V,w h e r ek is the vacancy cost.




= 0. Since (3.1) implies S
¡¯ V
¢
= 0 and (2.1) implies ¯ V = u(¯ w)/r, (3.3) implies ˙ V =0a t




J = k,t h e n¯ w = y − rk/q(¯ V ). Let ¯ q ∈ (0,∞) be the upper bound on q, discussed






< ¯ q,o ﬀering a constant wage slightly above
¯ w would yield a higher expected value to the ﬁrm.6 Therefore,
¯ w = y − rk/¯ q (<y ), J = k/¯ q (> 0). (3.8)
For the contracting part of a ﬁrm’s decisions, the optimal contract, {˜ w(t)}∞
t=0,s o l v e s :
(P)m a x ˜ J(0), subject to V (0) = x.
This problem diﬀers from that in BC (2003) in two aspects. First, BC assume u(0) = −∞ to
prove ˜ w(t) > 0a n dd ˜ w(t)/dt > 0 for all t. This assumption is not necessary in the current model,
because employed and unemployed workers face the same employment rate function. Second, the
quit rate of a worker employed at V is p(F (V )) here, but it is λ[1 − Q(V )] in BC, where Q(.)
is the distribution of oﬀers and λ a constant. Despite these diﬀerences, the following lemma is
similar to the results in BC:
Lemma 3.2. Assume (2.2). Optimal contracts have the following features: (i) 0 < ˜ w(t) ≤ ¯ w for











, all t; (3.9)
(iii) ˙ V (t) > 0 and d ˜ J (t)/dt < 0 for all t<∞,w i t hV (t) % ¯ V and ˜ J (t) & J as t →∞ .
Moreover,
d ˜ J (t)/dt = −
˙ V (t)
u0(˜ w(t))
,a l l t. (3.10)
Optimal contracts have several properties. First, wages are continuous and increasing in
tenure for all ﬁnite tenure lengths. This property is generated by ﬁrms’ incentive to backload
wages and workers’ risk aversion. Because a worker cannot commit to a job, a ﬁrm backloads
wages to entice the worker to stay. A rising wage proﬁle is less costly to the ﬁrm than a constant
proﬁle that promises the same value to the worker: as wages rise with tenure, it is more diﬃcult
for the worker to ﬁnd a better oﬀer elsewhere, and so the worker’s quit rate falls. However, if
workers are risk neutral, one optimal way to backload wages is to oﬀer a very low wage initially,
with promised wage jumps in the future (see Stevens, 2004). Risk aversion makes such jumps
suboptimal. Thus, wages increase continuously in tenure in optimal contracts.
6Suppose that q(¯ V )=¯ q − a for some a>0. In this case, ¯ w = y − rk/(¯ q − a). A ﬁrm that deviates from ¯ w to
¯ w + ε,w i t hε>0, attracts all of the workers who are employed at ¯ w, because the deviating ﬁrm is the only one
that oﬀers a wage higher than ¯ w.T h u s ,q(ˆ V )=¯ q,w h e r eˆ V = u(¯ w + ε)/r. The deviating ﬁrm’s expected value of
recruiting is (y − ¯ w − ε)¯ q/r, that exceeds k for suﬃciently small ε>0. A contradiction.
6Second, wages and values are strictly increasing in tenure for all ﬁnite tenure lengths. To
explain this result, suppose that an optimal contract has a constant segment of wages. This seg-
ment should be put at the beginning of the contract in order to increase the room for backloading
wages. Moreover, the constant segment must be at the constrained level, 0; otherwise, the ﬁrm
can increase its expected value by reducing the initial wage and shortening the constant segment.
However, such a contract has a strictly lower value than the value of unemployment, because an
unemployed worker enjoys a positive beneﬁt and faces the same job opportunities as an employed
worker does. Thus, a contract with such a constant segment of wages will not be accepted.
Third, optimal contracts induce eﬃcient sharing of the value between a ﬁrm and its worker,
in the sense described by (3.10). To elaborate, note that −d ˜ J/dt is the marginal cost to the ﬁrm
of increasing wages, while ˙ V/ u 0 (˜ w) is the marginal beneﬁt to the worker of the wage increase,
measured in the same unit as proﬁt. Thus, (3.10) requires that a wage increase should have the
same marginal cost to the ﬁrm as the marginal beneﬁtt ot h ew o r k e r .
Fourth, all optimal contracts are sections of a baseline contract. The baseline contract, denoted
as {˜ wb(t)}∞
t=0, is an optimal contract where ˜ wb (0) is the lowest wage in an equilibrium. The entire
set of optimal contracts can be constructed as follows:
{{ ˜ w(t)}∞
t=0 :˜ w(t)= ˜ wb(t + ta), ta ∈ [0,∞), for all t}.
That is, the “tail” of the baseline contract from any arbitrary tenure ta onward is an optimal
contract by itself when oﬀered at the beginning of the match. This property is an implication of
the principle of dynamic optimality.7
With the above property, it suﬃces to examine only the baseline contract. From now on, I
suppress the subscript b on the baseline contract. In particular, V (t) denotes the value of the
baseline contract for a worker at tenure t. Note that the set of equilibrium oﬀers across contracts
at any given time can be obtained alternatively by tracing out the baseline contract over tenure.
That is, V = {x : x = V (t), all t ≥ 0}.
4. Equilibrium and Block Recursivity
Iw i l lu s eV instead of t as the variable in various functions. To do so, deﬁne
T(V (t)) = t, w(V )= ˜ w(T (V )), J (V )= ˜ J (T (V )). (4.1)
T(V ) is the inverse function of V (t), and records the length of time for the value to increase
from the lowest equilibrium oﬀer, v1,t oV . A contract of a value V starts with the wage, w(V ),
and generates a present value, J (V ), to a ﬁrm. Refer to w(V )a st h ewage function.S i n c e




, all V<¯ V .( 4 . 2 )
7If the property does not hold for some tenure ta > 0, then there is another contract, { ˆ w(t)}
∞
t=0, that yields a
higher value to the ﬁrm than the contract, { ˜ w(t)}
∞
t=0,w h e r e˜ w(t)= ˜ wb (t + ta)f o ra l lt.R e p l a c et h et a i lo f t h e
baseline contract from tenure ta onward by letting ˆ wb (t + ta)= ˆ w(t) for all t. The new baseline contract yields a
higher value to the ﬁrm than the original baseline contract, contradicting the optimality of the latter.
74.1. Deﬁnition of the Equilibrium and Block Recursivity
An equilibrium consists of a set of oﬀers, V = {V (t):t ≥ 0}, a hiring rate function, q(.), an
employment function, p(.), an application strategy, F(.), a value function, J(.), a wage function,
w(.), a distribution of employed workers over values, G(.), and a fraction of employed workers,
n, that satisfy the following requirements: (i) Given p(.), F(V ) solves (3.1); (ii) Given F(.)a n d
p(.), each oﬀer x ∈ V is delivered by a contract that solves (P), and the resulting value function
of the ﬁrm is J(x); (iii) Zero expected proﬁt of recruiting: q(x)J(x)=k for all x ∈ [V , ¯ V ], and
q(x)J(x) <kotherwise, where q(x)=M−1(p(x)); (iv) G and n are stationary.8
Most elements of this deﬁnition are self-explanatory, except (iii). Requirement (iii) asks
expected proﬁt of recruiting to be zero for all x ∈ [V , ¯ V ], and it implies that an equilibrium
indeed has meaningful tradeoﬀs between oﬀers and matching rates in all submarkets. Given
J(.), the requirement yields the hiring rate function as q(x)=k/J(x), and the employment
rate function as p(x)=M(k/J(x)). Because J (x) decreases in x (see (4.2)), the hiring rate is
increasing and the employment rate decreasing in the oﬀer, as I have used in previous sections.
Note that requirement (iii) is imposed not just on equilibrium oﬀers in V, but on all oﬀers in
[V , ¯ V ]. Because the lowest equilibrium oﬀer is v1 = F (Vu) >V u >V, V is a strict subset of
[V , ¯ V ]. Thus, requirement (iii) restricts the beliefs out of the equilibrium. By completing the
markets, this restriction reﬁnes the set of equilibria and has been commonly used in directed
search models, e.g., Moen (1997), Acemoglu and Shimer (1999b) and Delacroix and Shi (2006).9
A striking property of an equilibrium is block recursivity: Although the distribution of workers
over wages or values depends on the aggregation of individuals’ decisions, parts (i) — (iii) above
are self-contained and independent of the distribution. Thus, the distribution plays no role in
individuals’ decisions, optimal contracts, the equilibrium functions, p(.)a n dq(.), and employed
workers’ job-to-job transitions. The reason for this independence is that directed search separates
the applicants into diﬀerent submarkets and, in each submarket, free entry of ﬁrms determines
the number of vacancies independently of the distributions of workers in other submarkets. As a
result, the matching rate functions, p(.)a n dq(.), are independent of the distributions.
To elaborate, consider the ﬁxed-point problem formed by (i) — (iii) in the above deﬁnition.
Given q(.), the matching function yields the employment rate function, p(.). Knowing p(.)i s
suﬃcient for the workers to choose the optimal target, F(.). The functions, p(V )a n dF(V ),
determine the quit rate of a worker at each V .F o r a ﬁrm, the worker’s quit rate summarizes
all the eﬀects of competition on the ﬁrm’s expected stream of proﬁts. Thus, given the quit rate,
the ﬁrm can calculate the expected value delivered by any wage contract, and hence can choose
the contract optimally. This optimal choice determines the wage function, w(.), and the ﬁrm’s
8The model can be extended to allow for a sunk cost of creating a vacancy, C,i na d d i t i o nt ot h eﬂow cost, k.
Let R be the expected value of a vacancy, measured after a ﬁrm has incurred C.T h e n ,R and the optimal oﬀer
solve: ρR = −k +m a x x {q(x)[J (x) − R]}. Free entry of vacancies requires R = C. In this economy, (iii) in the
equilibrium deﬁnition is modiﬁed as q (x)[J (x) − C] ≤ k + ρC, with equality for all x ∈

V , ¯ V

. An equilibrium is
well deﬁned if either k>0o rρ>0. Only when k = ρ =0i st h e r en oﬁnite R that satisﬁes R = C.
9To see why there can be missing markets in general, suppose that all agents believe that no one will participate
in submarket x.W i t hs u c hb e l i e f s ,n oﬁrm will post a vacancy and no worker will search in submarket x.T h u s ,
the beliefs that submarket x will be missing is self-fulﬁlling. This outcome of a missing market may not be robust
to a trembling-hand event that exogenously puts some ﬁrms in submarket x.
8value function, J(.). Finally, the free-entry condition ties the loop by determining the hiring rate
function q(.) that, in an equilibrium, must be the same as the one with which the process started.
The distributions of oﬀers and workers do not appear in this process.
Note that an equilibrium is block recursive even if there is exogenous separation into unem-
ployment, which I have assumed away. With such separation, the value for a worker can still be
determined given the function, p(.), without any reference to the distributions.10
Block recursivity relies critically on endogenous separation of workers, which is an implication
of directed search. Not surprisingly, undirected search models (e.g., Burdett and Mortensen, 1998,
and BC, 2003) do not have this property. With undirected search, a worker’s quit rate is a function
of the distribution of oﬀers because the worker can receive an oﬀer anywhere in the distribution
of oﬀers, and a ﬁrm’s hiring rate is a function of the distribution of workers because all workers
whose current values are less than the ﬁrm’s oﬀer will accept the oﬀer. Thus, the distributions of
oﬀe r sa n dw o r k e r sa ﬀect individuals’ decisions and contracts in undirected search models. In turn,
these decisions and contracts aﬀect the ﬂows of workers that determine the distribution of workers.
The two-way dependence and the dimensionality of the distribution make an equilibrium analysis
complicated in undirected search models. Block recursivity simpliﬁes an equilibrium drastically.
4.2. Existence of an Equilibrium
This subsection determines the equilibrium functions, p(.), q(.), w(.), F (.)a n dJ(.). I refer to
existence of these functions as existence of an equilibrium, although an equilibrium also involves
the distribution of workers that will be determined in section 6 later.
The following procedure formalizes the ﬁxed-point problem discussed above. It is more con-
venient to develop a mapping on the wage function, w(V ), than on q(.). Start with an arbitrary
function, w(.). First, integrating (4.2), and using J(¯ V )=J = k/¯ q (see (3.8)), I get:






The subscript w on J,a n do n( q,p,F,S) below, indicates the dependence on the initial function







Third, with pw(V ), the solution to (3.1) yields a worker’s optimal search as Fw(V ), and the
expected gain from search as Sw(V ). (3.3) yields ˙ Vw, and (3.5) yields dJw (V (t))/dt.
Fourth, I combine (3.10) with (3.5) and (3.3). Recall that optimal contracts require ˙ V (t) > 0
for all t<∞ (see Lemma 3.2). However, ˙ Vw (t) constructed from an arbitrary w may not
necessarily be positive. To ensure that every step of the equilibrium mapping satisﬁes ˙ Vw ≥ 0, I
10If the number of ﬁrms is ﬁxed, rather than being determined by free entry, the expected value of recruiting is
endogenous and depends on the distribution of workers. Even in this case, the distribution plays only a limited role
because it aﬀects individuals’ decisions and the functions p(.)a n dq(.) entirely through a one-dimensional object,
i.e., the expected value of recruiting.
9modify (3.10) as d ˜ Jw (t)/dt = −max{0, ˙ Vw}/u0 (˜ w). Substituting ˙ Vw from (3.3), and d ˜ Jw (t)/dt
from (3.5), into (3.10), I get w(V )=ψw(V ), where the mapping ψ is deﬁned as follows:
ψw(V ) ≡ y − [r + pw (Fw (V ))]Jw (V ) −
max{0,rV − Sw (V ) − u(w(V ))}
u0 (w(V ))
. (4.5)
The equilibrium wage function is a ﬁxed point of ψ.W i t ht h i sﬁxed point, the ﬁrst three steps
above recover q(.), p(.), J (.), F (.)a n dS (.) in an equilibrium. Clearly, all these functions are
independent of the distribution of workers.
To characterize the ﬁxed point of ψ,d e ﬁne:
Ω =
©
w(V ):w(V ) ∈ [w, ¯ w] for all V ; w(¯ V )= ¯ w;




w ∈ Ω : w(V ) is strictly increasing for all V<¯ V
ª
. (4.7)
The equilibrium wage function must lie in Ω0 (see Lemma 3.2). In addition, I must verify that
the equilibrium wage function induces a function p(.), through (4.4), that indeed satisﬁes (2.2).
To this end, I impose the following assumption on the matching function M (q):
Assumption 1. (i) M(q) is continuous and q(V ) ∈ [q, ¯ q] for all V ,w h e r eq will be speciﬁed in
(4.8) and ¯ q<∞;( i i )M0(q) < 0 and M(¯ q)=0 ; (iii) M (q) is twice diﬀerentiable for all q ∈ [q, ¯ q],
where |M0| ≤ m1 and |M00| ≤ m2 for some ﬁnite constants m1 and m2;( i v )qM00(q)+2M0(q) ≤ 0.
Part (i) is a regularity condition. In particular, the upper bound on q is imposed to apply a
ﬁxed-point theorem on bounded and continuous functions. Part (ii) captures the intuitive feature
that if it is easy for a ﬁrm to ﬁll a vacancy, it must be diﬃcult for a worker to obtain a job. In
the extreme case where a ﬁrm can ﬁll a vacancy at the maximum rate, the employment rate is
0. Part (iii) simpliﬁes the proof of existence signiﬁcantly. By restricting convexity of M(q), part
(iv) helps establishing concavity of p(.), which is stated in (2.2) and used to ensure uniqueness
of each worker’s optimal search decision. Assumption 1 is satisﬁed by the so-called telegraph
matching function, M(θ,1) = ¯ qθ/(1 + θ), which implies M (q)=¯ q − q.11
Next, I specify the following bounds on various functions. Deﬁne:
J ≡ k/¯ q, ¯ J ≡ J ¯ w (V ),q ≡ k/ ¯ J, ¯ p ≡ M(q), ¯ S ≡ S ¯ w (V ). (4.8)
Because Jw (V ), pw (V )a n dSw (V ) are decreasing in V ,a n dqw (V )i n c r e a s i n gi nV ,t h e n








,a l lw ∈ Ω,a l lV.
Choose the lower bound on wages, w,t ob eas t r i c t l yp o s i t i v en u m b e rs u ﬃciently close to 0.
11As another example, consider the Cobb-Douglas matching function, which has M(θ,1) = θ
α,w h e r eα ∈ (0,1).
This function implies p = ˆ M (q) ≡ q
(α−1)/α.L e t ¯ q be a suﬃciently large but ﬁnite constant, and let M (q)=
ˆ M (q) − ˆ M (¯ q). Then M (q)s a t i s ﬁes Assumption 1 iﬀ α ≥ 1/2.
10Assumption 2. Assume that b, V and w satisfy:
(0 <) b<¯ w = y − rk/¯ q, (4.9)
y − [r + p ¯ w (F ¯ w (V ))] ¯ J ≥ w +
£







2 [u(¯ w) − u(w)] ≥ 0,a l lw ∈ [w, ¯ w]. (4.11)
Note that all elements in the above assumption can be derived exclusively from exogenous
objects of the model. (4.9) is necessary for there to be any worker employed. (4.10) is suﬃcient
for ψw(V ) ≥ w for all V , and (4.11) suﬃcient for ψ to map increasing functions into increasing
functions. There is a non-empty region of parameter values that satisfy all of these conditions.12
The following theorem establishes existence of an equilibrium that indeed satisﬁes (2.2) (see
Appendix B for a proof):
Theorem 4.1. Maintain Assumptions 1 and 2. The mapping ψ has a ﬁxed point w∗ ∈ Ω0.









= J;( i i )pw∗ (V ) has all the properties in (2.2) and is strictly concave for all V<¯ V ; (iii)
˙ Vw∗ > 0 and dJw∗ (V (t))/dt < 0 for all V<¯ V .
Remark 1. Although I have focused on an equilibrium that satisﬁes (2.2), all equilibria must
have a strictly decreasing p(.).I fp(V2) ≥ p(V1) for some V2 >V 1,t h e nq(V2) ≤ q(V1).I nt h i s
case, no worker would apply to V1,n oﬁrm would recruit at V2,a n ds oV1 and V2 could not both
be equilibrium oﬀers. Similarly, p(.) must be continuous in all equilibria. In contrast, not all
equilibria necessarily have a concave and diﬀerentiable p(.). However, it is natural to focus on
equilibria with a concave and diﬀerentiable p(.). Concavity of p(.) is useful for ensuring that each
worker’s optimal search decision is unique, and diﬀerentiability of p(.) allows me to characterize
this optimal decision with the ﬁrst-order condition.
I will suppress the asterisk on w∗ and the subscript w∗ on the functions J, p, q, F and S.
Moreover, I will focus on a wage function, w(V ), that is diﬀerentiable.
5. Job Transitions, Wage Mobility and Policy Analysis
A typical worker in this model experiences continuous wage increases when he stays with a job
and discrete jumps in wages when he transits to another job. For example, consider a worker in
12(4.9) can be easily satisﬁed. By choosing w suﬃciently close to 0, and using the assumption u
0 (0) →∞ ,Ic a n
ensure (4.10) if [r + p ¯ w (F ¯ w (V ))] ¯ J<y . Because the left-hand side of this inequality is a decreasing function of V ,
the inequality puts a lower bound on V . This lower bound is smaller than ¯ V ,b e c a u s e










rJ <y .U s i n gt h ed e ﬁnition of V , I can translate this lower bound on V into a lower bound on b, which is smaller
than ¯ w.H e n c e , t h e r e a r e v a l u e s o f b that satisfy both (4.9) and (4.10). Finally, there are utility functions that
satisfy (4.11). For example, the utility function with constant relative risk aversion satisﬁes (4.11) if the relative
risk aversion is lower than a critical level.
11unemployment. The worker’s value is Vu and he applies for the oﬀer v1 = F (Vu). If he obtains
the oﬀer, the value jumps to v1, and the target of his next search is v2 = F (v1). If the worker
obtains the next oﬀer, his value jumps to v2. If the worker fails to obtain the oﬀer v2,t h ev a l u ef o r
the worker increases continuously according to the contract. In both cases, the worker revises the
target of search according to F (.). This process continues to increase the worker’s value toward
¯ V asymptotically until the worker dies.
The above process has the following predictions that are consistent with the stylized facts
described in the introduction. First, wages and values strictly increase with tenure, as shown by
w0 (V ) > 0a n d ˙ V (t) > 0. Second, the rate at which a worker quits a job for a better oﬀer strictly
decreases with tenure and wages, as shown by the result that p(F (V )) strictly decreases in V .
The cause for this feature is directed search, rather than the fact that a low-wage worker has
more wage levels to which he can transit to than a high-wage worker does. With directed search,
low-wage workers optimally choose to search for relatively low oﬀers that are easier to get, and
so they make job transitions with higher probabilities than high-wage workers do. Third, wage
mobility is limited endogenously, because the workers at a wage w(V ) optimally choose to search
only for the contract that starts at the wage w(F (V )). The lower a worker’s current wage, the
lower the future wage he will move to in the next job transition.
Now consider two policies: an increase in the unemployment beneﬁt, b, and a minimum-wage
requirement, w ≥ wmin. For the minimum wage to be non-trivial, assume that w(v1) <w min,
where w(v1) is the lowest equilibrium wage in the absence of the minimum wage. The following
corollary summarizes the eﬀects of these policies (the proof is straightforward and omitted):
Corollary 5.1. Changes in b and wmin do not aﬀect the functions w(.), F(.), p(.), q(.),a n d
J(.). Hence, they do not aﬀect an employed worker’s transitions or contracts, conditional on the
worker’s current wage. However, they aﬀect the distribution of workers and increases the lowest
oﬀer in an equilibrium, v1. Moreover, an increase in b increases the value for unemployed workers,
Vu, and reduces the measure of employed workers, n.A ni n c r e a s ei nwmin reduces n and Vu.
T os e em o r ec l e a r l yt h ee ﬀects of the policies, suppose that the policies increase v1 to ˆ v1.T h e
oﬀers in [v1, ˆ v1) are no longer equilibrium oﬀers, but the new baseline contract is the tail of the
original baseline contract that starts at ˆ v1. Since the latter is an equilibrium contract prior to the
policy change, the set of equilibrium contracts after the policy change is a subset of the original
set of equilibrium contracts. Conditional on a worker’s current value (or wage), the worker’s
optimal application, the wage-tenure contract and the worker’s transition rate to another job are
all independent of the two policies. The reason for this independence is block recursivity of an
equilibrium with directed search. Because the ﬁxed-point problem that determines q, p, F, J and
w involves only employed workers and not unemployed workers, its solution does not depend on
policies that aﬀect only unemployed workers.
The policies do aﬀect aggregate activities in the current model, by aﬀecting (v1,V u)a n dt h e
distribution of workers. These eﬀects, stated in Corollary 5.1, are intuitive. For example, a higher
unemployment beneﬁt reduces employment, because it makes unemployed workers “picky” about
oﬀers. Note that an increase in the minimum wage reduces the value for unemployed workers,
despite that it raises the target value of an unemployed worker’s search. The explanation is that
12the original target value, v1, provides the best tradeoﬀ for an unemployed applicant between
the oﬀer and the employment rate. By raising the target value, the minimum wage reduces an
unemployed worker’s transition rate into employment by so much that it cannot be adequately
compensated by the rise in the target value.
Let me contrast the results in this section with those in BC (2003). Modeling search as an
undirected process, BC has also shown that wages increase, and quit rates fall, with tenure.
However, their model does not generate limited wage mobility; instead, even a worker at the
bottom of the wage distribution can immediately transit to the top of the distribution. Moreover,
because their model does not have block recursivity, the two policies above aﬀect contracts and
individuals’ transitions through the distribution of workers. In particular, an increase in the
unemployment beneﬁt in that model increases the equilibrium distribution of oﬀers, the job-to-
job transition rate, and the slope of the wage-tenure contracts.13
6. Equilibrium Distribution of Workers




,a n dg the
corresponding density function.14 For any arbitrary V ∈ V and a small interval of time, dt,l e t
me examine the ﬂows in and out of the group of workers who are employed at values less than or
equal to V . The measure of this group is nG(V ). The only inﬂow is unemployed workers who
ﬁnd matches at v1,w h i c hi s( 1− n)p(v1)dt.T h e r ea r et h r e eo u t ﬂows. First, death generates an
outﬂow, δnG(V )dt. Second, the contracts increase the values for the workers in (V − ˙ Vd t ,V]
above V ,t h eﬂow of which is n[G(V ) − G(V − ˙ Vd t ) ] .T h i r d ,s o m ew o r k e r si nt h eg r o u pq u i tf o r
oﬀers higher than V . These quitters are currently employed in (F−1 (V ),V]i fF−1 (V ) ≥ v1,a n d





Equating the inﬂows to the sum of outﬂows, and taking the limit dt ↓ 0, I obtain:
lim
dt↓0









Theorem 6.1. Denote vj = F(j)(v0), j =1 ,2,...,w h e r eF(0)(v0)=v0 ≡ Vu and F(j)(v0)=
F(F(j−1)(v0)). Then, G(V ) is continuous for all V ,w i t hG(v1)=0 . The density function, g(V ),
is continuous for all V , and diﬀerentiable except for V = v2.M o r e o v e r ,
n = p(v1)/[δ + p(v1)] , (6.2)
13Both the current model and BC (2003) assume that there is no exogenous separation into unemployment. If
such exogenous separation is introduced, the two policies will aﬀect equilibrium contracts and employed workers’
transitions in the current model, because the value of unemployment will appear in the equation that determines
the value for employed workers. Even in this extension of the current model, it is still true that the policies do not
aﬀect contracts and worker transitions through the distribution of workers.
14The distribution of employed workers over wages can be deduced as Gw(w(V )) = G(V ), with a density function
gw(w(V )) = g(V )/w
0(V ).




With the function T (V ) in (4.1), deﬁne:





[δ + p(F (V (t)))]dt
#
, z1,z 2 ≥ v1. (6.4)
Add a subscript j to g(V ) for V ∈ [vj,v j+1). g can be recursively solved piece-wise as follows:
g1(V ) ˙ V = δΓ(V,v1), (6.5)




where (6.6) holds for j ≥ 2.M o r e o v e r ,gj(vj)=l i m V ↑vj gj−1(V ) for all j.
The above theorem documents several features. First, the equilibrium distribution of employed
workers is non-degenerate and continuous, despite that all matches are identical and search is
directed. Both on-the-job search and wage-tenure contracts are important for this dispersion of
values. If on-the-job search were prohibited, only one value, v1,w o u l db eo ﬀered in an equilibrium,
as in most models of directed search with homogeneous matches. On-the-job search produces
jumps in values, and hence a non-degenerate distribution of values. However, without wage-
tenure contracts, on-the-job search alone would only produce a wage ladder formed by the set,
{v1,v 2,...,¯ V }, as in Delacroix and Shi (2006). Wage-tenure contracts provide continuous increases
in the values to ﬁll in the gaps between any two levels in this discrete set.
Second, there is no mass point anywhere in the support of the distribution. It is particularly
remarkable that there is no build-up of workers at v1. Although all unemployed workers only
apply for v1,a l lw o r k e r sa tv1 move out of v1 in any arbitrarily short length of time, as a result of
quits, death, or wage increases in the contracts. Moreover, the density function is diﬀerentiable
except at V = v2.I ti sn o td i ﬀerentiable at v2 because oﬀers above v2 receive applications from
employed workers but oﬀers below v2 do not.15
Finally, more workers are employed at low values than at high values, because the job-to-
job transition rate decreases sharply in the target value. In particular, as V approaches ¯ V ,t h e
employment rate declines to 0, which requires the measure of recruiting ﬁrms per applicant to
approach zero. Thus, the density function g (V ) can be decreasing for V close to ¯ V .
7. Conclusion
I have constructed a theoretical framework in which ﬁrms oﬀer wage-tenure contracts to direct
the search by risk-averse workers. All workers can search, on or oﬀ the job. I have characterized
an equilibrium and proved its existence. The equilibrium generates a non-degenerate, continuous
15Similarly, the density function of oﬀe r si sd i s c o n t i n u o u s ,b e c a u s eam a s so fﬁrms recruit at v1 but no ﬁrm
recruits at V ∈ (v1,v 2). To eliminate non-diﬀerentiability of g at v2 and discontinuity of the oﬀer density, an earlier
v e r s i o no ft h i sp a p e ra s s u m e st h a tb is distributed in an interval whose upper bound is equal to ¯ w.
14distribution of employed workers over the values of contracts, despite that all matches are identical
and workers observe all oﬀers. A striking property is that the equilibrium is block recursive; that
is, individuals’ optimal decisions and optimal contracts are independent of the distribution of
workers. This property makes the equilibrium analysis tractable. Consistent with stylized facts,
the equilibrium predicts that (i) wages increase with tenure, (ii) job-to-job transitions decrease
with tenure and wages, and (iii) wage mobility is limited in the sense that the lower the worker’s
wage, the lower the future wage a worker will move to in the next job transition. Moreover, block
recursivity implies that changes in the unemployment beneﬁt and the minimum wage have no
eﬀect on an employed worker’s job-to-job transitions and contracts.
The theoretical framework is tractable for a wide range of applications and extensions, because
of block recursivity. In particular, Menzio and Shi (2008) incorporate aggregate and match-
speciﬁc shocks into the model to examine dynamics and business cycles with on-the-job search.
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16Appendix
A. Proof of Lemma 3.1
The result F(¯ V )=¯ V is evident. Let V<¯ V , and denote K(x,V )=p(x)(x − V ). Let V1 and V2
be two arbitrary values with V1 <V 2 < ¯ V , and denote Fi = F (Vi), where i =1 ,2.
For part (i), because p(.) is bounded and continuous, K(x,V ) is bounded and continuous.





and K(V,V)=0=K(¯ V,V), the solutions are interior. Interior solutions and diﬀerentiability of
p(.)i m p l yt h a tF (V )i sg i v e nb yt h eﬁrst-order condition, (3.2). Take two distinct values, V2 and
V1. They must generate diﬀerent values for the right-hand side of (3.2). Thus, F (V1)∩F (V2)=∅
for all V2 6= V1. This result implies that K(Fi,V i) >K (Fj,V i)f o rj 6= i.Ih a v e :
0 > [K (F2,V 1) − K (F1,V 1)] + [K (F1,V 2) − K (F2,V 2)] = [p(F2) − p(F1)](V2 − V1).
Thus, p(F2) <p (F1). Because p(.) is strictly decreasing, F(V2) >F(V1).
For part (ii), I show that K(x,V ) is strictly concave in x for all x ∈ (V, ¯ V ). Let x1 and x2 be
two arbitrary values with x2 >x 1 >V.L e txα = αx1 +( 1− α)x2,w h e r eα ∈ (0,1). Then,
K(xα,V) ≥ [αp(x1)+( 1− α)p(x2)][α(x1 − V )+( 1− α)(x2 − V )]
= αK(x1,V)+( 1− α)K(x2,V)+α(1 − α)[p(x1) − p(x2)][x2 − x1]
>α K (x1,V)+( 1− α)K(x2,V).
The ﬁrst inequality comes from concavity of p, and the last from strictly decreasing p(.). Thus,
K(x,V ) is strictly concave in x,a n dF (V ) is unique. Uniqueness implies that F(V ) is continuous
in V , by the Theorem of the Maximum (see Stokey and Lucas, 1989, p62).
For part (iii), note that K(F1,V 1) >K (F2,V 1)a n dK(F2,V 2) >K (F1,V 2). Then,
S(V2) − S(V1) >K (F1,V 2) − K(F1,V 1)=−p(F1)(V2 − V1);
S(V2) − S(V1) <K (F2,V 2) − K(F2,V 1)=−p(F2)(V2 − V1).
Divide the two inequalities by (V2 −V1) and take the limit V2 → V1. Because F(.) is continuous,
the limit shows that S0(V1)=−p(F1). Since V1 is arbitrary, part (iii) holds for all V .
For part (iv), because p is decreasing and concave, p(F1) ≥ p(F2) − p0(F1)(F2 − F1). Substi-
tuting this inequality into (3.2) yields:
V2 − V1 ≥ 2(F2 − F1)+p(F2)
p0 (F1) − p0 (F2)
p0 (F1)p0 (F2)
≥ 2(F2 − F1).
This implies F2 − F1 ≤ (V2 − V1)/2, and so F is Lipschitz.
For part (v), if p is twice diﬀerentiable, then diﬀerentiating (3.2) generates F0(V ). Part (iv)
implies F0(V ) ≤ 1/2. Hence, S00(V )=−p0(F(V ))F0(V ). QED
B. Proof of Theorem 4.1
Consider the sets, Ω and Ω0,d e ﬁned by (4.6) and (4.7) respectively. It can be veriﬁed that Ω is
non-empty, closed, bounded and convex. Lemma B.1 below shows that properties (i) and (ii) in
Theorem 4.1 are satisﬁed not only by Jw∗ and pw∗, but also by Jw and pw that are constructed
through (4.3) and (4.4) with any arbitrary w ∈ Ω. Thus, (2.2) and parts (i) - (iv) of Lemma
173.1 hold in every iteration of the mapping ψ (deﬁned by (4.5)), not just with the ﬁxed point. In
particular, Fw(V ) is strictly increasing and satisﬁes (3.2) in every iteration. Lemma B.2 below,
whose proof uses (4.11), describes additional properties that will be used in the proofs of Lemmas
B.3, B.4 and B.5. The latter three lemmas establish that the mapping ψ satisﬁes the conditions
of the Schauder ﬁxed-point theorem (see Stokey and Lucas, 1989, p520). Therefore, ψ has a ﬁxed
point in Ω, denoted as w∗.L e m m aB . 3t h e ni m p l i e sw∗(V )=( ψw∗)(V ) ∈ Ω0.
Finally, I show that ˙ Vw∗ > 0 for all V<¯ V ,a si n( i i i )o fT h e o r e m4 . 1 . O n c et h i si sd o n e ,
(4.5) implies dJw∗ (V (t))/dt = −max{0, ˙ V ∗
w (V )}/u0 (w∗ (V )) < 0 for all V<¯ V . Suppose that
˙ Vw∗ ≤ 0f o rs o m eV1 < ¯ V , contrary to the theorem. In this case, (4.5) implies: w∗ (V1)=
y − [r + pw∗ (Fw∗ (V1))]Jw∗ (V1), and so
˙ Vw∗ = rV1 − Sw∗ (V1) − u(y − [r + pw∗ (Fw∗ (V1))]Jw∗ (V1)).
With the properties of Jw∗ and pw∗ in Lemma B.1, the right-hand side of the above equation is
strictly decreasing in V1, and equal to 0 at V1 = ¯ V .T h u s ,˙ Vw∗ > 0a tV1. A contradiction. This
completes the proof of Theorem 4.1. QED
The proofs of Lemmas B.1, B.2, B.3, and B.4 below are omitted but can be found in the
supplementary material.
Lemma B.1. For any w ∈ Ω, Jw(V ) and pw (V ),d e ﬁned by (4.3) and (4.4), have the following




, pw (V ) ∈ [0, ¯ p], Jw
¡¯ V
¢




=0 ,w h e r eJ, ¯ J and ¯ p are deﬁned in (4.8); (ii) They are strictly decreasing, continuously
diﬀerentiable, and concave for all V ; (iii) If w ∈ Ω0,t h e nJw (V ) and pw (V ) are strictly concave.
Lemma B.2. Let w1,w 2,w∈ Ω.( i )pw (Fw (V )) is increasing in w in the sense that if w2 (V ) ≥




[rV1 − Sw (V1)] − [rV2 − Sw (V2)]
u0 (w(V1))
, (B.1)
where ∆ is deﬁned as follows:
∆ = 1
u0(w(V1)) max{0,rV 1 − Sw (V1) − u(w(V1))}
− 1
u0(w(V2)) max{0,rV 2 − Sw (V2) − u(w(V2))}.
(B.2)
Lemma B.3. ψ : Ω → Ω0 ⊂ Ω.
Lemma B.4. ψ is Lipschitz continuous in the sup norm.




for j =0 ,1,2,....
The family of functions, {ψjw}∞
j=0, is equicontinuous.
Proof. Take an arbitrary w ∈ Ω and construct the family, {ψjw}∞
j=0. The family is equicon-
tinuous if it satisﬁes the following requirement (see Stokey and Lucas, 1989, p520): For any given
ε>0, there exists a>0 such that, for all V1 and V2,
|V2 − V1| <a=⇒
¯ ¯ψjw(V2) − ψjw(V1)
¯ ¯ <ε , all j.( B . 3 )
I use the following procedure to establish (B.3). In the entire procedure, ﬁx w as an arbitrary
function in Ω and ε>0 as an arbitrary number. First, because w is continuous, and the domain
18of w,[ w, ¯ w], is bounded and closed, w is uniformly continuous. Thus, there exists a0 > 0s u c h
that, for all V1 and V2, |V2 − V1| <a 0 =⇒ |w(V2) − w(V1)| <ε . Second, I show that there exists
a1 > 0 such that, for all V1 and V2,i f|w(V2) − w(V1)| <ε ,t h e n
|V2 − V1| <a 1 =⇒ |ψw(V2) − ψw(V1)| <ε . (B.4)
Let a =m i n {a0,a 1}. Then, w and ψw both satisfy (B.3). Third, replacing w with ψw,a n da0
with a, the above two steps yield that ψ2w satisﬁes (B.3). Repeating this process but ﬁxing a at
the level just deﬁned, it is easy to see that ψjw satisﬁes (B.3) for all j.
Only (B.4) needs a proof. Take arbitrary V1 and V2 that satisfy: |w(V2) − w(V1)| <ε .A s
before, shorten the notation f (Vi)t ofi,w h e r ef includes the functions w, Jw, Fw, pw, Sw and
ψw. Without loss of generality, assume V2 ≥ V1.S i n c ew(V )a n dψw(V ) are increasing functions,
then w2 ≥ w1 and ψw2 ≥ ψw1.W i t ht h eﬁrst inequality in (B.1), I have:
(0 ≤) ψw2 − ψw1 ≤ [r + pw (Fw1)](Jw1 − Jw2)
+Jw2 [pw (Fw1) − pw (Fw2)] + [u(w2) − u(w1)]/u0 (w1).
(B.5)
Examine the three terms on the right-hand side in turn. Using (4.3), I obtain 0 ≤ Jw1−Jw2 ≤
(V2 − V1)/u0 (¯ w). For the diﬀerence in pw (F), recall that Fw2 − Fw1 ≤ (V2 − V1)/2( s e eL e m m a




¯ ¯ ¯ ≤ B1 ≡ m1¯ q2/k,w h e r em1 is speciﬁed in
Assumption 1. Thus,










≤ B1 [Jw (Fw1) − Jw (Fw2)] ≤ B1 [Fw2 − Fw1]/u0 (¯ w) ≤ B1 (V2 − V1)/[2u0 (¯ w)].
(B.6)
To examine the last term in (B.5), deﬁne L(w) ≡ u(w)−u(w1)−u0 (w1)(w − w1)+
μ1
2 (w − w1)
2,
where μ1 ≡ minw∈[w, ¯ w] |u00 (w)| > 0. Because L is concave, and L0 (w1)=0 ,L(w) is maximized








2 .( B . 7 )
The RHS of (B.7) is maximized at w2 − w1 =[ u0 (w)/μ1]
1/2.R e c a l l t h a t w2 − w1 <ε .I f
ε ≤ [u0 (w)/μ1]
1/2, the RHS of (B.7) is increasing in (w2 − w1), and so it is strictly smaller






.I f ε>[u0 (w)/μ1]
1/2,t h e nR H S ( B . 7 )
< 1
2 [u0 (w)/μ1]




















.( B . 8 )
Substitute the above bounds on the terms on the RHS of (B.5). Noting that pw (Fw) ≤ ¯ p and
Jw ≤ ¯ J,w h e r e¯ p and ¯ J are deﬁned in (4.8), I obtain:









where A3 ∈ (0,∞)i sd e ﬁned as A3 ≡
³




/u0 (¯ w). A suﬃcient condition for ψw2 −









. Because A3 ∈ (0,∞), w > 0, and μ1 ∈ (0,∞), then a1 > 0, and (B.4)
holds. Moreover, a1 is independent of a0,g i v e nε. This completes the proof of Lemma B.5. QED
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C. Supplementary Appendix
C . 1 .P r o o fo fL e m m a3 . 2
Consider the ﬁrm’s optimization problem, (P). The state variable is V that obeys (3.3). Treat
γ,d e ﬁned in (3.6), as an auxiliary state variable whose law of motion is:
d
dt
γ (t,ta)=−[r + p(F(V (t)))]γ(t,ta). (C.1)
Denote the shadow price of V as ΛV ,a n do fγ as Λγ. Then, the Hamiltonian of (P)i s :
H(t)=( y − ˜ w)γ(t,0) + ΛV [rV − S(V ) − u(˜ w)] − Λγ [r + p(F (V ))]γ(t,0),
where I have suppressed the dependence of the variables on t,e x c e p tt h a to fγ.D e n o t eΛc(t)=
ΛV (t)/γ(t,0), where the subscript c indicates the “current value”. The optimality conditions of
˜ w, V and γ are as follows:
−u0(˜ w)Λc − 1 ≤ 0a n d ˜ w ≥ 0, with complementary slackness; (C.2)
˙ Λc = Λγdp(F (V ))/dV ;( C . 3 )
˙ Λγ = −(y − ˜ w)+Λγ [r + p(F (V ))]. (C.4)
To derive (C.3), I have used the fact that S0(V )=−p(F (V )) (see Lemma 3.1).
Using (C.1), I can rewrite (C.4) as d
dt [γ(t,0)Λγ(t)] = −[y − ˜ w(t)]γ(t,0). Integrating this
equation under the transversality condition, limt→∞ γ(t,0)Λγ(t)=0 ,Ig e tΛγ(t)= ˜ J(t) for all t,
where ˜ J(.) is given by (3.7). Substituting Λγ = ˜ J into (C.3) and the Hamiltonian yields:






−d ˜ J (t)/dt + Λc (t) ˙ V (t)
i
. (C.6)
Because p(F (V )) strictly decreases in V for all t<∞, ˙ Λc(t) < 0 for all t<∞.
Deﬁne t0 by Λc (t0)=0 .T h e r ei sa tm o s to n es u c ht0,b e c a u s e ˙ Λc < 0. Moreover, Λc(t) > 0
for all t<t 0,a n dΛc(t) < 0f o ra l lt>t 0. For all t ≤ t0, −u0 (˜ w(t))Λc(t) ≤ 0, in which case (C.2)
implies ˜ w(t)=0 . F o ra l lt>t 0, the assumption u0(0) = ∞ ensures ˜ w(t) > 0: if ˜ w(t) = 0, then
−u0 (˜ w(t))Λc (t) − 1=∞ > 0, which contradicts (C.2).
The remainder of the proof establishes a sequence of results. First, d ˜ w(t)/dt > 0 for all
t>t 0. Suppose, to the contrary, that d ˜ w(t)/dt ≤ 0a tt = t1 for some t1 ∈ (t0,∞). Because




−u0 (˜ w(t))Λc (t)
¤




1Because d ˜ w(t)/dt ≤ 0a tt = t1 and Λc (t) < 0f o rt>t 0, the derivative above on the RHS
is strictly positive for t near t1. As a result, there exists ε>0 such that −u0 (˜ w(t))Λc (t) >
−u0 (˜ w(t1))Λc (t1)=1f o rt ∈ (t1,t 1 + ε], where the equality follows from (C.2) and ˜ w(t1) > 0.
This result contradicts (C.2). Thus, I have shown that the wage path has the following form:
½
˜ w(t)=0 , f o rt<t 0;
˜ w(t) > 0a n dd ˜ w(t)/dt > 0, for t ∈ (t0,∞).
(C.7)
Because ˜ w(t) is bounded for all t, and increasing, then ˜ w(t) % ¯ w as t →∞ .






1+u0 (˜ w(t))Λc (t)
¤ d ˜ w(t)
dt
=0 ,
where the second equality uses the results that d ˜ w(t)/dt =0f o rt<t 0,a n d1 + u0 (˜ w(t))Λc (t)=0
for t ≥ t0. Because limt→∞ H(t)=0 ,t h e nH(t) = 0 for all t, which can be rewritten as
d ˜ J (t)/dt = Λc (t) ˙ V (t), allt.( C . 8 )
Third, ˙ V (t) > 0 for all t<∞,a n d ˜ J (t) is maximized at t = t0. Suppose, to the contrary,
that ˙ V (t1) ≤ 0f o rs o m et1 < ∞.I f t1 >t 0,t h e nd ˜ w(t)/dt > 0f o ra l lt ∈ [t1,∞)( s e e( C . 7 ) ) .
Diﬀerentiating (3.3) yields:
d ˙ V (t)
dt




˙ V (t1) ≤ 0i m p l i e sd ˙ V (t)/dt < 0a tt = t1. By induction, d ˙ V (t)/dt < 0 for all t ∈ [t1,∞). Thus,
V (t) strictly decreases toward ¯ V as t increases from t1 to ∞, contradicting the fact that V (t) ≤ ¯ V
for all t<∞.I ft1 ≤ t0,t h e n˜ w(t1) = 0 by (C.7), and so (3.3) implies: rV (t1)−S (V (t1)) ≤ u(0).
This result and (3.4) yield:
rVu − S(Vu) − u(b) − [rV (t1) − S (V (t1))] + u(0) ≥ 0.
Because S0 (V ) < 0, the left-hand side of the equation is strictly decreasing in V (t1). Because
the left-hand side is negative at V (t1)=Vu,t h e nV (t1) <V u. In this case, the worker will quit
into unemployment, which will be suboptimal to the ﬁrm. A contradiction.
Recall that Λc(t) > 0 for all t<t 0,a n dΛc(t) < 0f o ra l lt>t 0. (C.8) and ˙ V> 0i m p l yt h a t
d ˜ J (t)/dt > 0f o ra l lt<t 0,a n dd ˜ J (t)/dt < 0 for all t>t 0.T h a ti s ,˜ J (t) is maximized at t = t0.
Fourth, t0 ≤ 0; thus, ˜ w(t) > 0 for all t>0, and d ˜ w(t)/dt > 0 for all t<∞ (see (C.7)).
Suppose t0 > 0, to the contrary. Then, ˜ J (t0) > ˜ J (0) by the previous result. Let {˜ w(t)}∞
t=0 be the
optimal contract that generates ˜ J (0) to the ﬁrm. Consider an alternative contract, { ˆ w(t)}∞
t=0,
where ˆ w(t)=˜ w(t + t0) for all t. This alternative contract is feasible and generates a higher value
to the ﬁrm, ˜ J (t0), than the optimal contract. A contradiction.
Finally, (3.9) and (3.10) hold. Because ˜ w(t) > 0 for all t,t h e nΛc(t)=−1/u0 (˜ w(t)) for all t.
Diﬀerentiating this equation with respect to t, and substituting (C.5), I get (3.9). Substituting
Λc into (C.8) yields (3.10). Because ˙ V (t) > 0, and ˜ w(t) > 0, for all t<∞,t h e nd ˜ J (t)/dt < 0
for all t<∞. QED
2C . 2 .P r o o fo fL e m m aB . 1
Let w ∈ Ω. Part (i) of the lemma was established in the analysis immediately following (4.8). It
is easy to verify from (4.3) that Jw(V ) is strictly decreasing and continuously diﬀerentiable, with
J0
w(V )=−1/u0(w(V )) < 0. Since w(V ) is increasing, then J0
w(V ) is decreasing, and so Jw(V )i s
(weakly) concave. Because qw (V )=k/Jw (V )a n dpw (V )=M (qw (V )), I have:
p0
w(V )=




where M0 (q) < 0 by Assumption 1. This shows that pw (V ) is strictly decreasing and contin-




decreasing in q. Because qw (V )i si n c r e a s i n gi nV , M0 (qw (V ))[qw (V )]
2 is decreasing in V .B e -
cause 1/u0(w(V )) is increasing in V ,a n dM0 < 0, then p0
w(V ) is decreasing. That is, pw(V )i s
(weakly) concave, and so part (ii) of the Lemma holds.
If w ∈ Ω0, i.e., if w(V ) is strictly increasing for all V<¯ V , then it is straightforward to
strengthen the argument for part (ii) to show that Jw (V )a n dpw (V ) are strictly concave, as
stated in part (iii). QED
C . 3 .P r o o fo fL e m m aB . 2
To prove part (i) of the lemma, pick two arbitrary functions w1, w2 ∈ Ω,w i t hw2 (V ) ≥ w1 (V )
for all V . Simplify the notation Jwi to Ji, Fwi to Fi and pwi to pi,w h e r ei =1 ,2. Because
w2 (V ) ≥ w1 (V ) for all V , (4.3) implies J2 (V ) ≥ J1 (V ), and the assumption M0 < 0i m p l i e s
p2 (V ) ≥ p1 (V ), for all V . Suppose, contrary to part (i) of the Lemma, that p1 (F1 (V )) >
p2 (F2 (V )) for some V .L e tqi = k/Ji (Fi (V )), i =1 ,2. Because pi (Fi (V )) = M (qi), and M (q)
is strictly decreasing in q, the supposition implies q1 <q 2, and hence J1 (F1 (V )) >J 2 (F2 (V )).
Monotonicity of Jw in w implies J2 (F2 (V )) ≥ J1 (F2 (V )). In this case, J1 (F1 (V )) >J 1 (F2 (V )),
and so F1 (V ) <F 2 (V ). With these results, I can derive:
0 <p 1 (F1 (V )) − p2 (F2 (V ))
= p0
2 (F2 (V ))[F2 (V ) − V ] − p0
1 (F1 (V ))[F1 (V ) − V ]
< [p0
2 (F2 (V )) − p0



















The ﬁrst inequality comes from the supposition, the ﬁrst equality from (3.2), the second inequality
from F2 (V ) >F 1 (V )a n dp0
2 (F2) < 0, the second equality from computing p0
i (Fi), and the last
inequality from M0 (q2) < 0a n dw2 (F2 (V )) ≥ w1 (F2 (V )) ≥ w1 (F1 (V )). Parts (iii) and (iv)
of Assumption 1 imply that M0 (q)q2 is decreasing in q. Because q2 >q 1, as shown above, the
expression in the last line above is non-positive. A contradiction.
T op r o v ep a r t( i i )o ft h el e m m a ,l e tw ∈ Ω,a n dV2 ≥ V1.N o t et h a tw(V2) ≥ w(V1), because
w ∈ Ω. Moreover, because [rV − Sw (V )] is strictly increasing in V , rV2−Sw (V2) ≥ rV1−Sw (V1).
Hence, the following inequality holds:




max{0,rV 1 − Sw (V1) − u(w(V1))}
−max{0,rV 1 − Sw (V1) − u(w(V2))}
¸
.
3Consider all possible cases: (a) rV1 − Sw (V1) ≥ u(w(V2)); (b) rV1 − Sw (V1) ≤ u(w(V1)); and





Thus, the ﬁrst inequality in (B.1) holds.
To establish the second inequality in (B.1), I ﬁrst show that
max{0,rV 2 − Sw (V2) − u(w(V2))} ≤
u0 (w(V2))
u0 (w(V1))
max{0,rV 2 − Sw (V2) − u(w(V1))}.
This inequality is evident when rV2 −Sw (V2) ≤ u(w(V2)), because the left-hand side is 0 in that
case. If rV2 − Sw (V2) >u(w(V2)), the above inequality becomes:
rV2 − Sw (V2) − u(w(V2))
u0 (w(V2))
≤
rV2 − Sw (V2) − u(w(V1))
u0 (w(V1))
.
Because [rV − Sw (V )] is strictly increasing in V , rV2 − Sw (V2) ≤ r¯ V − Sw
¡¯ V
¢
= u(¯ w). In this
case, (4.11) implies that [rV − Sw (V ) − u(w)]/u0 (w) is decreasing in w, for any given V and
Sw (V ). Since w(V2) ≥ w(V1), the above inequality holds.





max{0,rV 1 − Sw (V1) − u(w(V1))}
−max{0,rV 2 − Sw (V2) − u(w(V1))}
¸
.
Consider all of the possible cases: (a) u(w(V1)) ≥ rV2 − Sw (V2); (b) u(w(V1)) ≤ rV1 − Sw (V1);
and (c) rV1 − Sw (V1) <u(w(V1)) <r V 2 − Sw (V2). In each case, it is straightforward to deduce
the second inequality in (B.1) from the above relation. QED
C . 4 .P r o o fo fL e m m aB . 3
Let w ∈ Ω, and consider the function ψw(V ). With Lemma B.1, ψw(V ) is a continuous and
bounded function of V . Next, I prove that ψw(V ) is an increasing function. To do so, let V1
and V2 be arbitrary values in
£
V , ¯ V
¤
,w i t hV2 ≥ V1. Simplify the notation f (Vi)t ofi,w h e r ef
includes the functions w, Jw, Fw, Sw and ψw.Is h o wt h a tψw2 ≥ ψw1. To do so, use the second
inequality in (B.1) to obtain:
ψw2 − ψw1 ≥ [r + pw (Fw1)]Jw1 − [r + pw (Fw2)]Jw2
+[rV1 − Sw1 − (rV2 − Sw2)]/u0 (w1)
=[ r + pw (Fw1)](Jw1 − Jw2)+Jw2 [pw (Fw1) − pw (Fw2)]
+[rV1 − Sw1 − (rV2 − Sw2)]/u0 (w1).
Because [rV − Sw (V )]
0 = r + pw (Fw), and
£
r¯ V − Sw
¡¯ V
¢¤
= u(¯ w), then
rV − Sw (V )=u(¯ w) −
Z ¯ V
V
[r + pw (Fw (z))]dz.
Using this result, and expressing Jw (V ) as in (4.3), I get:












4The inequality follows from pw (Fw1) ≥ pw (Fw (z)), and u0 (w(z)) ≤ u0 (w1), for all z ∈ [V1,V 2].
Because pw (F) is a decreasing function of F, I have established:
ψw2 − ψw1 ≥ Jw2 [pw (Fw1) − pw (Fw2)] ≥ 0. (C.10)
Now I verify ψw(V ) ∈ [w, ¯ w] for all V ,w i t hψw
¡¯ V
¢










= 0, it is clear that ψw
¡¯ V
¢




for all V . Similarly, ψw(V ) ≥ w for all V if and only if ψw(V ) ≥ w. To establish the latter




[rV − Sw (V ) − u(w(V ))] ≤
1
u0 (w)
[u(b) − Sw (V ) − u(w)].
The right-hand side of the inequality is non-negative, because w is set to be small. Thus,
ψw(V ) ≥ y − [r + pw (Fw (V ))]Jw (V ) − 1
u0(w) [u(b) − Sw (V ) − u(w)]
≥ y − [r + p ¯ w (F ¯ w (V ))] ¯ J − 1
u0(w)
£
u(b) − Sw (V ) − u(w)
¤
.
The ﬁrst inequality comes from the preceding result. The second inequality uses part (i) of
Lemma B.2, the upper bound on J (deﬁned in (4.8)), and the fact that Sw (V )i si n c r e a s i n gi nw
for any given V . With the above result, (4.10) implies ψw(V ) ≥ w. Therefore, ψ maps functions
in Ω into functions in Ω.
Finally, if V2 >V 1, the inequalities in (C.9) and (C.10) are strict, because Fw (V ) is strictly
increasing and pw (Fw (V )) is strictly decreasing in V for all V<¯ V (see Lemma B.2). In this
case, ψw ∈ Ω0 ⊂ Ω. This completes the proof of Lemma B.3. QED
C . 5 .P r o o fo fL e m m aB . 4
I prove that the following inequality holds for all w1,w 2 ∈ Ω,a n da l lV :
|ψw2(V ) − ψw1(V )| ≤ Akw2 − w1k, (C.11)
where the norm is the sup norm and A is a ﬁnite constant. Once this is done, Lipschitz continuity
of ψ is evident from the following inequality:
kψw2 − ψw1k =m a x
V
|ψw2(V ) − ψw1(V )| ≤ Akw2 − w1k.
To show (C.11), take two arbitrary functions, w1,w 2 ∈ Ω,a n dﬁx V at an arbitrary value in
[V , ¯ V ]. Without loss of generality, assume ψw2(V ) ≥ ψw1(V ) for this given V .S i n c eV is ﬁxed,
I suppress it from the functions if this does not cause confusion. Also, shorten the subscript wi
on J, p, F,a n dS to i,w h e r ei =1 ,2. I have:
0 ≤ ψw2 (V ) − ψw1 (V )=[ r + p1 (F1)](J1 − J2)+J2 [p1 (F1) − p2 (F2)] + ∆2,
where
∆2 =m a x
½
0,










To proceed, note that the following inequalities hold for all a1 and a2:
max{0,a 1} − max{0,a 2} ≤ max{0,a 1 − a2} ≤ |a1 − a2|.
5Using these results, it is easy to verify that
∆2 ≤
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
rV − S1 − u(w1)
u0 (w1)
−
rV − S1 − u(w2)
u0 (w2)




Denote the ﬁrst term on the right-hand side above as ∆3.D e ﬁne:
μ1 =m i n
w∈[w, ¯ w]
¯ ¯u00 (w)




μ1 and μ2 are positive and ﬁnite. Because (rV − S1) is strictly increasing in V , rV −S1 ≤ u(¯ w).






rV − S1 − u(w)
u0 (w)
¶¯
¯ ¯ ¯ ≤ 1+
μ2
u0 (¯ w)
(¯ w − w) ≡ A1, (C.13)
Hence,
∆3 ≤ A1 |w2 − w1|, ∆2 ≤ A1 |w2 − w1| + |S2 − S1|/u0 (¯ w).
Substituting these results into the earlier expression for [ψw2 (V ) − ψw1 (V )], and using the
bounds in (4.8), I obtain:
0 ≤ ψw2 (V ) − ψw1 (V ) ≤ (r +¯ p)|J1 − J2| + ¯ J |p2 (F2) − p1 (F1)|
+|S2 − S1|/u0 (¯ w)+A1 |w2 − w1|.
(C.14)
L e tm ee x a m i n et h eﬁrst three terms on the right-hand side above. With μ2 deﬁn e di n( C . 1 2 ) ,
the following inequality holds for all w1, w2 ∈ [w, ¯ w]:










Using this result and (4.3), I have:
|J1 − J2| ≤
Z ¯ V
V






¯ ¯ ¯ ¯dz ≤ A2
¡¯ V − V
¢
kw2 − w1k. (C.16)
To put a bound on the diﬀerence, |p2 (F2) − p1 (F1)|,d e ﬁne:
B1 ≡ m1¯ q2/k, B2 ≡ (¯ qm2 +2 m1)¯ q3/k2, (C.17)
where m1 and m2 are the bounds speciﬁed in Assumption 1. Clearly, B1 and B2 are ﬁnite.
Because k/Jw = qw ≤ ¯ q, it is straightforward to verify that
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
dM(k/Jw)
dJw
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ≤ B1,




¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ≤ B2. (C.18)
Using these bounds, (C.15) and (C.16), I can derive the following results for all z ∈
£
V , ¯ V
¤
:
|p2 (z) − p1 (z)| ≤ B1 |J2 (z) − J1 (z)| ≤ B1A2
¡¯ V − V
¢






















¯ ¯ ¯ 1
u0(w2(z)) − 1
u0(w1(z))
¯ ¯ ¯ + 1
u0(w2(z))












≤ B1A2 kw2 − w1k + B2





¡¯ V − V
¢i
A2 kw2 − w1k.
(C.20)
6Now, examine the diﬀerence, |p2 (F2) − p1 (F1)|.A s s u m eF2 ≥ F1, without loss of generality.
(If F2 ≤ F1,s w i t c ht h er o l e so fF1 and F2 in the proof, and the resulting bound is the same.) In
t h ec a s ew h e r ep2(F2) <p 1(F1), I have the following inequalities:
0 <p 1(F1) − p2(F2)=−p0
1(F1)(F1 − V )+p0







The equality follows from (3.2), and the last inequality from the fact that p0
2 (F)(F − V )i s
decreasing in F.B e c a u s e0≤ F1 − V ≤ ¯ V − V , the above result and (C.20) imply:









¡¯ V − V
¢
kw2 − w1k. (C.21)
I nt h ec a s ew h e r ep2 (F2) ≥ p1 (F1), the following inequalities hold:
0 ≤ p2(F2) − p1(F1) ≤ p2(F1) − p1(F1) ≤ B1A2
¡¯ V − V
¢
kw1 − w2k.
The second inequality comes from the fact that p is decreasing, and the last inequality from
(C.19). Thus, (C.21) holds in this case too.
Next, turn to the diﬀerence, |S2 − S1|. Because S1 is the maximum of p1 (F)(F − V )o v e rF,
then S1 ≥ p1 (F2)(F2 − V ). Using the inequality and (C.19), I have:
S2 − S1 ≤ p2 (F2)(F2 − V ) − p1 (F2)(F2 − V )
=( F2 − V )[p2(F2) − p1(F2)] ≤ B1A2
¡¯ V − V
¢2 kw2 − w1k.
Similarly, using the inequality, S2 ≥ p2 (F1)(F1 − V ), I can show that (S1 − S2) is bounded by
the same upper bound as above. Hence,
|S2 − S1| ≤ B1A2
¡¯ V − V
¢2 kw2 − w1k. (C.22)
Assembling (C.16), (C.21) and (C.22) into (C.14), I obtain (C.11), where A is given as
A = A1 + A2





B1 ¯ J +
B1 + B2 ¯ J
u0(¯ w)




Clearly, A is ﬁnite. Moreover, A is independent of the particular functions w1 and w2 with which
the functions (Ji,q i, pi,F i,S i) are constructed. QED
C . 6 .P r o o fo fT h e o r e m6 . 1
First, I derive (6.2). Set V = ¯ V in (6.1). Because ˙ V =0a tV = ¯ V , the left-hand side of (6.1)
is equal to 0 at V = ¯ V . Moreover, the integral in (6.1) is equal to zero, because F−1(¯ V )=¯ V .
Thus, at V = ¯ V , (6.1) yields (6.2).
Second, I show that G is continuous; i.e., G does not have any mass point. Suppose, to the
contrary, that G has a mass a>0 at some value V ∈ [v1, ¯ V ]. Then, G(V )−G(V − ˙ Vd t ) ≥ a for
all dt > 0, and so the left-hand side of (6.1) is equal to ∞. This is a contradiction, because the
right-hand side of (6.1) is bounded.
Third, to establish (6.3) and continuity of g, denote the left-hand side derivative of G as g(V−).
The left-hand side of (6.1) is equal to g(V−) ˙ V . Because G, F, F−1 and p(.) are continuous, the
right-hand side of (6.1) is continuous in V .T h u s , g(V−) ˙ V must be continuous. Because ˙ V is
continuous, g must be continuous. Then, I can express the left-hand side of (6.1) as g(V ) ˙ V .
After substituting p(v1) from (6.2), (6.1) becomes (6.3).
7Fourth, g is continuously diﬀerentiable for all V 6= v2. To see this, note that F, F−1 and
p(.) are continuously diﬀerentiable. Since g is continuous, G is continuously diﬀerentiable, and
so the right-hand side of (6.3) is continuously diﬀerentiable for all V 6= v2. Thus, the left-hand
side of the equation, g (V ) ˙ V ,m u s tb ec o n t i n u o u s l yd i ﬀerentiable for all V 6= v2.B e c a u s e˙ V is
continuously diﬀerentiable, g (V ) is continuously diﬀerentiable for all V 6= v2.
Fifth, I derive (6.5). For V ∈ (v1,v 2), F−1(V ) <v 1, and so (6.3) becomes:




Note that T0 (V )=1 / ˙ V from (4.1). Diﬀerentiating the function Γ in (6.4) yields:
dΓ(V,v1)/dV = −[δ + p(F (V ))]Γ(V,v1)/ ˙ V. (C.24)








Recall that G1(v1)=0 ,b e c a u s eG(V ) is continuous for all V .T a k i n gt h el i m i tV ↓ v1 in (C.23)
leads to g1(v1)˙ v1 = δ. With this initial condition, integrating (C.25) from v1 to V yields (6.5).
Since g is continuous, taking the limit V ↑ v2 in (6.5) gives g(v2).
Finally, I derive (6.6) by examining the case V ∈ [vj,v j+1), where j ≥ 2. In this case,
F−1(V ) ≥ v1, and so (6.3) becomes:







I have separated the two groups of applicants who obtain jobs with values above V : one coming
















Integrating this equation from vj to V yields (6.6). Because g is continuous, then gj(vj)=
limV ↑vj gj−1(V ), all j. This completes the proof of Theorem 6.1. QED
8